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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT, SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT, ERRED BY
AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED TO AND STRUCK FROM EVIDENCE
THE REASON THERE WAS NO GOOD CAUSE FOR THE STATE'S INABILITY
TO OBTAIN AN AFTER-HOURS SEARCH WARRANT

The state in its response brief tries to make this case harder than it really is.
Rather than quibble about what defense counsel really said in his closing argument
at the motion to suppress hearing, Appellant will simply provide the exigent
circumstances argument in full in one place (removing the truly irrelevant), since it
was only provided in portions in his opening brief. Defense counsel argued:
I'll turn my argument next to the exigent circumstances. To my
mind the trooper articulated several facts which he observed which
might have led him to believe that my client was under the
influence of alcohol, but prosecutor Bandy stated one of the reasons
he thought there was an exigent circumstance is the natural
dissipation of alcohol. That was his testimony.
First of all, I don't know that his opinion is all that relevant
because - I think this case presents a conundrum for this court
where essentially the prosecutor made an attempt to contact the
judge, several attempts, three to five by his testimony, but then he
just authorized the blood draw. And if we're going to allow
prosecuting attorneys to make good faith attempts -- I'm not saying
there was anything but a good faith attempt-- but if that's
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unsuccessful to just authorize blood draws, that is the province of
the judicial branch, it is the province of your Honor and the other
judges elected and appointed in this state. It is not on prosecuting
attorneys.
[impairment theory argument]
There were no exigent circumstances in this case. If this court is to
determine that the inability of the prosecution to obtain a warrant by
contacting a judge justifies exigent circumstances, I think that, (a),
that is an improper factor to consider. Exigent circumstance has to do
with the factors of the case, of the officer and the defendant.
Prosecute [sic] Bandy said well one of the reasons was natural
dissipation of alcohol. McNeely makes it clear that that cannot be one
of the exigent circumstances. The prosecutor in her argument said,
well, one of the exigent circumstances is we couldn't get a warrant. I
don't think that is a proper factor.
The exigent circumstances has to do with whether or not the defendant
is intentionally delaying the process, it as [sic] to do with other factors
about Schmerber which the prosecutor cites whether there's going to
be a medical examination, whether this person is going to have the
opportunity to make an arrest or whether there's going to be
subsequent hospitalization of those items. And none of the factors are
present.
To my mind what has been argued before this court today was we saw
a lot of signs they were intoxicated and time was a wasting. And
McNeely says that that is not the proper analysis, that you have to
have something more than just time.
[Retrograde extrapolation argument]
We have a case here where there was no warrant. The officer
testified he thought he needed a warrant. I think everybody agrees
that absent an exception, a warrant was required here. The
justification for the two exceptions to the search warrant are invalid
here. They don't have actual consent. I think implied consent is
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implicitly overruled by McNeely and there were not exigent
circumstances in this case.
And I think the court should be somewhat troubled or cautious
allowing prosecutors to make good faith attempts but then
unilaterally authorize search warrants. That is dangerous
prosecutors can unilaterally authorizing warrants if they can't get
front of a judge.

m
to
if
in

Thank you.
Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 33, ln. 8-p. 37, ln. 4 (emphasis added). (R. p.
49-50.)
Defense counsel is clearly arguing that the inability to obtain a warrant is
not a factor to be considered for exigent circumstances. This is directly contrary
to the then controlling law of McNeely v. Missouri, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552
(2013), and not just error after State v. Chernobieff, 166 Idaho 537 (2016), as the
district court (sitting as an appellate court) in this case found.
Defense counsel also is clearly making a separation of powers argument,
to wit, that it is for the judiciary to authorize blood draws, not the prosecutor if
the judge cannot be reached. If there is any doubt about this it is answered by
the magistrate's comments in his ruling in response:
Unfortunately it didn't work in this instance and Mr. Bandy didn't
have a lot of choices, and he instructed Corporal Sly to take the
blood, which is a call I think Mr. Bandy can make, and he does so at
his peril. But prosecutors are asked to make those kind of calls all
the time. They're called to find out if officers can break down the
door and officers are told yes or no. So I don't fault Mr. Bandy

3

for how he handled it, I do think he has the authority and he did
not usurp the judge's authority. And so that's my ruling.
Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 42, Ins. 5-15 (emphasis added). (R. p. 51.)
Next, Appellant's argument is that defense counsel clearly does not
argue that the prosecutor's effort to reach the magistrate was insufficient in
terms of effort to establish exigent circumstances, which seems to be how
the state is using the term insufficient. Rather, defense counsel argues the
prosecutor's attempts to reach the magistrate is not a factor at all to
establish exigent circumstances.
Defense counsel at no time argues (or even suggests) that only calling
the magistrate three to five times was not enough effort by the prosecutor,
and he should have done more before exigent circumstances can be found.
He instead argues that a prosecutor should not be able to authorize a blood
draw if he cannot reach a judge because that is the province of the judiciary,
not the prosecutors.
The state attempts to tie defense counsel's separation of powers
argument to what it claims is his earlier argument that the " ... prosecutor's
inability to contact the magistrate did not provide exigent circumstances to
skirt the warrant requirement." Respondent's Brief, p. 17.

4

If the state means that in the same way as Appellant, to wit, that the
inability to reach the judge is not a factor to be considered, it would be
correct. But to the extent that the state means that three to five attempts
was not enough effort, a close review of that passage again shows that
defense counsel never made that argument, and, rather, his comment about
the prosecutor's three to five attempts to contact the judge but then just
authorized the blood draw was merely a description of what happened and
was not argument.
First of all, I don't know that his op1n10n is all that relevant
because - I think this case presents a conundrum for this court
where essentially the prosecutor made an attempt to contact the
judge, several attempts, three to five by his testimony, but then he
just authorized the blood draw. And if we're going to allow
prosecuting attorneys to make good faith attempts -- I'm not saying
there was anything but a good faith attempt-- but if that's
unsuccessful to just authorize blood draws, that is the province of
the judicial branch, it is the province of your Honor and the other
judges elected and appointed in this state. It is not on prosecuting
attorneys.
Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 32, ln. 16-p. 34, ln. 4 (emphasis added). (R. p.
49.)

Regardless, contrary to the assertions of the State in its brief, defense
counsel never argues that the prosecutor's efforts are insufficient as in not
enough and more needed to be done for a finding of exigency. Rather, he
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argues that the prosecutor should not be able to authorize a blood draw at
all.
Likewise contrary to the State's assertion in its brief, defense counsel
did not "effectively argue, even if too broadly by saying they were not a
proper factor-- that the prosecutor's failed efforts to contact the magistrate
do not support a finding of exigency." Respondent's brief at p. 19. Rather, he
argued directly contrary to the controlling law that the ability to obtain a
warrant was not a proper factor to determine exigency. More broadly (and
wrongly), he argued that prosecutors should not be able to authorize blood
draws at all and only judges can.
Because of these arguments, there is simply no way that defense
counsel strategically objected so that the magistrate would only have the
three to five attempts to consider.

To defense counsel, not being able to

reach the magistrate at all is still not a proper factor to consider so it could
not have mattered whether the prosecutor could or could not have ever
reached the magistrate. Therefore, the district court's finding that this was
the strategic reason for the objection is completely unsupported by the
record.
Next, the State in its response brief makes an unsupported assumption
that because the testifying prosecutor (perhaps presciently accordingly to the state)

6

volunteered the rmger off testimony, it shows that he also concluded that such
testimony would help establish exigent circumstances.

First, he did not need to be

prescient to understand such testimony was relevant, all it took was reading

McNeely.

Once the 'cannot reach the magistrate' became relevant, the 'why'

necessarily follows since McNeely still required a case by case determination which
means evaluating the factors.
The majority opinion in McNeely stated as follows:
. . . . Other factors present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the
procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a
magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant
in an expeditious way and therefore may establish an exigency that
permits a warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining
whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical
problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still
preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt
vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.

McNeely, 569 U.S. at 164, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 (emphasis added).
Second, since the prosecutor understood the evidence of the ringer being off
was relevant (as defense counsel did not), there are still multiple reasons why the
prosecutor may have testified to the information even if it was unfavorable to the
State. He may have honestly and forthrightly testified about the 'why' regardless of
its effect on the state's case because he took seriously the prosecutor's
"responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." Idaho
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Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt 1.

Or understanding it was a problem,

he could have been presciently explaining why the fault was not his.
Quite frankly, it did not take McNeely or the Chernobieff direct appeal to
understand that the magistrate turning the ringer off on his cell phone was relevant
and cuts against the state. As mentioned in Appellant's opening brief, to allow
otherwise is to create a negligence exception to the warrant requirement where
being bad at getting a warrant becomes the reason a warrant is not required. 1
Nor did it take the direct appeal decision in Chernobieff to understand it is
the State's burden to establish the exception to the Fourth Amendment search
warrant requirement. As to the burden question, the state further attempts to
confuse matters.

Simply, the burden of proving exigent circumstances exist

has always been on the state. The Supreme Court's comment about evidence in
the Chernobieff direct appeal is not some new law that defense counsel could
not anticipate. It is nothing more than a complaint that the damning evidence
of the ringer being off is not in the record because defense counsel objected and
moved to strike it so it could not be considered on appeal.

Incidentally, as will be provided further below, the line of demarcation between
factors controllable in the court system itself or not came from the district court, not
Appellant. (R. p. 60.)
1
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The State argues at several places in its brief that the ringer being off on the
cell phone can be seen as so rare an occurrence that it should cut toward a finding of
exigent circumstances.

However, the State has it backwards.

If it is a rare

occurrence, then the state can forego this misdemeanor DUI prosecution where the
interest is a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment right against a warrantless
invasive body search and seizure since it chose not to have a backup system in place
as part of its "procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a
magistrate judge." McNeely, 569 U.S. at 164, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.
Finally, as to prejudice, the evidence would have made a difference. While the
motion to suppress should have been granted in the first instance, it does matter
whether the Supreme Court would have reversed because ultimately the question is
whether or not the BAC was suppressed.

It can also be determined that the evidence, along with a proper
understanding of the law, would have resulted in the district court sitting as an
appellate court in the direct appeal reversing as well. The district court ruled as
follows:
such exigent
. . . . The magistrate found that there were
circumstances in this case. Considerations which the magistrate
articulated included a determination that the defendant delayed the
process by refusing to take field sobriety tests, the events occurred at
11:00 p.m., the prosecutor made a good faith effort to obtain a warrant
through the process of an on-call judge who could not be reached, and
there was no system in place to go to a backup judge. Those findings
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are supported by the record. Whether they rise to the level of exigency
is the question. The lynch pin of that decision revolves around the
failed attempt to obtain a warrant through the system in place for an
on-call magistrate. By themselves the lateness of the hour and the
refusals to take field sobriety tests would not constitute exigent
circumstances. They are likely common conditions. They may be
weighed in the totality of the circumstances. Similarly, the change in
blood alcohol level as time passes is a natural occurrence that an
expeditious process seeks to limit. The final link to establish exigent
circumstances is whether the failure within the judicial system can be
weighed.
See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1562-63 ("[I]mprovements in
communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge
will be available when an officer needs a warrant after making a latenight arrest ... exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood
sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to
delays from the warrant application process ... Whether a warrantless
blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined
case by case based on the totality of the circumstances."). See also
February 4, 2014 Hearing Transcript, at 41: "At 11:00 p.m. there is
only one on-call judge, and even if Mr. Bandy were to call another
judge and get that judge up, that judge isn't really situated to hear
probable cause because the one digital recorder we have is with the
on-call judge. So it's kind of a pickle when you can't reach the on-call
judge." This is a problem one might expect more in a small county
rather than in Ada County. In any event, the determination of exigent
circumstances made by the magistrate is supported by the record.
However, and this is a very weighty however, this breakdown has been
exposed and can be addressed by a redundancy system, at least where
multiple judges are available. The logic of the old adage that every dog
gets one bite is applicable in this realm. It is very likely that a failure
in the judicial process in the future will not weigh as an exigency
unless that failure is tied to a failure of equipment or some other factor
not controllable in the court system itself.
Opinion on Appeal, p. 5-7 (emphasis added). (R. p. 58-60.)
Had the evidence of the ringer turned off come in, there would simply be no
excuse to allow that negligence, along with the shocking lack of a back up system, to
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weigh as an exigency. The other factors, lateness of the hour and refusal to take
field sobriety tests, do not (and the Supreme Court ruled in the direct appeal that
the defendant's refusal to take the field sobriety tests could not be considered).
All that is left is the change in blood alcohol level, which does not establish
exigency by itself according to McNeely. Thus, there should have been a different
result at the magistrate court level, but even if not, then the district court would
have reversed as the paragraph above shows. Then, the decision being reviewed by
the Supreme Court would of course have been different and there would not have
been substantial evidence showing exigency as the state argues in its brief.
Finally, had the BAC been suppressed, Mr. Chernobieff could not have been
found guilty of DUI excessive, nor even prosecuted for DUI according to the
prosecutor.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated and in Appellant's opening brief,
Appellant respectfully requests the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the magistrate court
for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2020.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of May, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing brief to be served via the file and serve system to the
email identified as the party's service contact:
Idaho State Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
acpocourtdocs@ada. web .net

Dated and certified this 20 th day of May, 2020.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
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